Volume: 5, Issue: 3 (2003)
pp. 263-290 DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001057
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Abstract |
Full Text (PDF, 298KB)
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| Title: |
Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria |
| Author(s): |
Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Department of Economics, University of Vienna,
Hohenstaufengasse 9, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
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| Abstract: |
This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of
symmetric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems
with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models
of imitation and myopic best reply are considered under different
assumptions on the speed of adjustment. It is found that two specific
refinements of mixed Nash equilibria identify focal rest points of
these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both
concepts is studied. In the 2×2 case, both imitation and
myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of
mixed Nash equilibria. |
| Keywords: |
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; imitation dynamics; best reply dynamics; learning; JEL classification code: C72; C73; D83
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